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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff Cache County agrees with defendant's statement of 
jurisdiction. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly hold that the lease was not 
properly terminated because the Beus Group failed to give proper 
notice under statutory prerequisites to place Cache County in 
unlawful detainer? 
Summary judgment issues are reviewed for correctness. Harline 
v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). 
2. Under equity principles, did the trial court correctly 
hold that Cache County's substantial compliance with the lease 
prevented forfeiture? 
The default standard of review for summary judgment is cor-
rectness. The Utah Supreme Court, however, in State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994), noted that when the trial court applies 
law to fact, such as in decisions of equity, an appeals court 
allows the trial court a "spectrum of discretion." 869 P. 2d 932, 
936-38 (Utah 1994) . Although the trial court rendered summary 
judgment, a bench trial would produce the same equitable decision, 
as the facts are undisputed. Therefore, the trial court's equit-
able decision should be reversed only for a clear abuse of 
discretion. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991) 
(citing Bountiful v. Riley. 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989)). 
3. Did the trial court properly grant Cache County's motion 
for summary judgment where no genuine issues of material fact 
remained? 
Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Harline v. 
Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1) (c) (1996) states as follows: 
78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(c) when he continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, after default in the 
payment of any rent and after a notice in 
writing requiring in the alternative the pay-
ment of the rent or the surrender of the 
detained premises, has remained uncomplied 
with for a period of three days after service, 
which notice may be served at any time after 
the rent becomes due . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Beus Group told Cache County its below-market ten-year 
lease was terminated, and to vacate its television transmission 
facilities; alternatively, Cache County could renegotiate its lease 
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at market rates. The County sought declaratory relief that the 
lease remained in full force and effect, and that the County and 
its sublessee, Cellular One, could remain on the site. This is an 
appeal by the Beus Group from the final Judgment and Order granting 
Cache County's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denying defendant's 
cross-motion. (R. at 331, 335.) 
B. Prqgeedings ^nd Disposition Bglgw. 
Plaintiff agrees with defendant's statement about the pro-
ceedings. The Beus Group will be referred to as Mefendant." 
C. Statement of Facts. 
In 1977, Cache County wished to acquire a one-acre site on top 
of Mt. Pisgah from which to transmit television signals from the 
Salt Lake Valley to the Cache Valley. (R. at 162, \ 6; Appellee 
Add.) It is the only site from which this task could be accom-
plished. (R. at 162, % 7; Appellee Add.) The owner of the unim-
proved mountaintop told the County to survey an acre and describe 
it on the quit-claim deed that the owner that would convey. (R. at 
14 9.) The Cache County surveyor surveyed a one-acre lot, along 
with a road to the lot. However, when the surveyor described the 
lot by metes and bounds in the deed, he made a series of errors 
that no one discovered for many years. The deed was recorded. 
(R. at 12; Appellant Add. 3.) 
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The County invested over $100,000 to construct a building on 
the mountaintop. (R. at 3.) Television signals could now be 
received in Cache County. The County charged neither the tele-
vision stations nor citizens for this service. (R. at 3.) 
In September 1986, the Beus Group bought the mountain, 
believing it had also purchased the County's television transmitter 
site. (R. at 12; Appellant Add. 3, p.l.) Early in 1990, the 
County subleased for a nominal fee a portion of the building to 
RSA 63 7 ("Cellular One") for five years, with three five-year 
options. (R. at 3, H 10.) 
The dispute between the County and defendant concerning owner-
ship of the mountaintop led to a 1990 a quiet-title action. (R. at 
12; Appellant Add. 3, p.l.) On May 2, 1994, the parties negotiated 
a settlement: the County would quit-claim the disputed property to 
the Beus Group in return for a ten-year lease at $500 per month--
substantially below market rates. (R. at 13-14; Appellant Add. 3, 
pp. 2-3.) The parties also agreed the County could honor its 
sublease to Cellular One for ten years at below-market rates. 
(R. at 14-15; Appellant Add. 3, pp. 3-4.) 
' In December 1994, Attorney Leo Beus, acting on behalf of the 
Beus Group, sent a letter purporting to terminate the lease because 
the County had mistakenly failed to pay rent from July through 
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November, 1994. (R. at 57.) Before getting the letter, however, 
the County had sent Attorney Beus a check for the full amount of 
rent owing. Attorney Beus cashed the check. (R. at 163; Appellee 
Add. 1, p. 3.) 
By April 1, 1995, the County had neglected to pay the rent for 
January, February, March, and April of that year. On April 3, 
1995, Attorney Beus sent a letter attempting again to terminate the 
lease because the rent had not been paid. (R. at 166; Appellant 
Add. 5.; Appellee Add.) The letter was received on April 10, 1995, 
by County Executive Lynn Lemon. Mr. Lemon immediately requested 
the County Auditor to pay $2000 to the Beus Group for the months 
January through April 1995. (R. at 163, 168; Appellee Add.) 
The lease allows the County ten days to pay after notice that 
rent is late. The County Auditor issued the $2000 check ten days 
later, on April 20, 1995. (R. at 168, 170, 227; Appellee Add.) The 
check was tendered by mail, postmarked April 21, 1995. (R. at 172, 
226; Appellant Add. 8, p. 2.) By letter dated April 26, 1995, 
Attorney Beus rejected the $2000 rent check on the ground that the 
check was late. (R. at 229.) 
On May 5, 1995, the County tendered another check to Attorney 
Beus, this one for $3000, the balance of 1995 rent. (R. at 172, 
231-32; Appellant Add. 8, pp. 2-3.) That check was received on 
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May 8, 1995. (R. at 232.) By letter dated May 10, 1995, Attorney 
Beus rejected the $3000 check, claiming the lease was terminated 
because the County failed to pay the rent within ten days of 
receiving notice the rent was late. (R. at 230-32.) He claimed the 
County was in unlawful detainer, and told the County and Cellular 
One to vacate. (R. at 172, 230-32; Appellant Add. 8, pp. 2-3.) 
In his letter of April 26, 1995, Attorney Beus offered to 
"negotiate a new lease at market rates." (R. at 22 9; Appellant 
Add. 7, p. 2.) According to Attorney Beus, the 1995 market rate 
was $7,000 a month, $78,000 a year more than the lease rate. 
(Motions for Summary Judgment Hearing Transcript, p. 11). 
Cellular One has threatened the County that it will sue for 
several hundred thousand dollars if the County is evicted and 
breaches Cellular One's sublease. (R. at 369; Transcript of 
Hearing on Summary Judgment Motions, pp. 11-12.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Judge Low correctly held that the defendant failed to 
place Cache County in unlawful detainer. Statutes require the 
landlord to give the tenant the written option to pay the rent due 
or vacate. Furthermore, Utah case law requires the statute be 
strictly followed. Defendant undisputedly failed to give Cache 
County the option of paying the rent, as the statute requires. 
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Therefore, defendant did not place Cache County in unlawful 
detainer. 
2. Judge Low properly refused to allow defendant to forfeit 
the lease. Under Utah law a court acting in equity may intervene 
to save a tenant from forfeiture when it has substantially complied 
with a lease, or when equitable principles otherwise forbid 
forfeiture. Cache County substantially complied with the lease: 
when Defendant's notice arrived, the County Executive immediately 
requested the Auditor to prepare a check for the rent owing. It 
was tendered only one day after the time allotted by the lease. 
Moreover, permitting forfeiture for such a minor breach would 
be inequitable: the County would lose all value it received from 
relinquishing its claim to the land, and the County would likely be 
saddled with a judgment of several hundred thousand dollars in 
favor of Cellular One--all because the rent was a day late. The 
court did not abuse its equitable discretion. Its decision should 
be affirmed. 
3. Judge Low properly granted Cache County's motion for 
summary judgment as there were no genuine issues of material fact. 
The Beus Group does not dispute any of the facts regarding its 
failure to comply with the statutory notice prerequisites. As to 
the court's equitable decision, Defendant never raised material 
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issues of fact at summary judgment, and only does so now for the 
first time. In any event, the record substantiates the trial 
court's holding that forfeiture of the lease would result in 
excessive damages to Cache County. Furthermore, the Beus Group 
presented no proof of any damage it suffered by getting the rent 
late. 
4, Cache County should be awarded its attorney fees and 
costs on appeal. Paragraph 16 of the lease provides that the 
"substantially prevailing party" is entitled to attorney fees and 
court costs. 
ARGUMENT 
X» THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE LEASE WAS 
NOT PROPERLY TERMINATED, BECAUSE THE BEUS GROUP 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY PREREQUISITES TO 
PLACE CACHE COUNTY IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
A. Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-3 (1) (c) controls. 
The trial court properly found the notice provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1) (c) must be strictly followed for a landlord 
to maintain an action for unlawful detainer. (R. at 333, Appellant 
Add. 1, p. 3.) Since defendant did not give Cache County the 
alternative of paying the rent or quitting the premises, the Court 
properly held that Cache County was entitled to a declaratory 
judgment that it was in rightful possession of the land. (R. at 
333; Appellant Add. 1, p. 3.) 
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To regain possession when a tenant fails v^ rent a 
landlord must follow U.C.A. § 78-36-3(1)(c): 
78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than 
life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(c) when he continues in possession, in 
person or by subtenant, after default in the 
payment of any rent and after a notice in 
writing requiring in the alternative the 
payment of the rent or the surrender of the 
detained premises. has remained uncomplied 
with for a period of three days after service, 
which notice may be served at any time after 
the rent becomes due . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (1) (c) (1996) (emphasis added). This 
provision plainly requires that Cache County be given written 
notice of its opportunity to cure any default in back rent. 
Defendant did not give the County this written chance to bring the 
rent current. 
Defendant relies on a different section of the Unlawful 
Detainer Statute to justify its failure to provide the required 
opportunity to pay the rent. This section provides: 
(1) A tenant of real property for a term less than life, 
is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession . 
after the expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him, which 
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specified term or period . . . shall be termi-
nated without notice at the expiration of the 
specified term or period. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1)(a). The "specified term" of the lease 
is ten years, from June 21, 1994, to June 20, 2004. (R. at 12; 
Appellant Add. 3, pp. 2-3.) Defendant sent the notices in 1995. 
Thus, the notices were not sent at "the expiration of the specified 
term or period for which [the property has been] let [to Cache 
County]." 
Defendant contends that "by giving Cache County notice to quit 
the property" it can render this section applicable; that its 
unilateral cancellation of the lease before its express expiration 
date entitles it to invoke the "no notice" provisions of § 78-36-
3(1) (a) . Defendant confuses basic legal terms. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "expiration": 
Expiration. Cessation; termination from mere lapse of 
time, as the expiration date of a lease, insurance 
policy, statute, and the like . . . . 
The term "expiration," as in an insurance policy, 
refers to termination of the policy by lapse of time 
covering the policy period, while "cancellation" refers 
to termination of the policy by act of either or both 
parties prior to the ending period of the policy. 
Black's Law Dictionary at 579. In Mountain Fuel Supply v. Reliance 
Ins. Co.. 933 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit applying 
Utah law, stated that "[c]ancellation and expiration are distinct 
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terms, with cancellation meaning termination of a policy prior to 
its contemplated expiration date by an act of one or more of the 
parties. Expiration is the natural termination of the policy at 
the lapse of the coverage period set forth in the policy's own 
terms." Iii. at 890 n. 11. Expiration, then, occurs only through 
the passage of time. Any act of the parties which triggers a 
premature termination of the lease is a "cancellation," not an 
"expiration." Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1)(a) allows a 
landlord to commence unlawful detainer proceedings without notice 
to the tenant only at the expiration of a lease for a term. 
Defendant's purported cancellation of the lease, even if it were 
effective, gives it no such right to rely on the "no notice" 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1) (a) to put the County in 
unlawful detainer. Consequently, Judge Low correctly ruled that 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1) (c) is the proper section with which 
defendant had to comply to put Cache County in unlawful detainer. 
(R. at 333; Appellant Add. 1, p. 3.) 
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B. The Beus group did not gtrjlgtXy comply with the 
Statutory prerequisites of giving Cache CQUnty 
proper notice of the alternative to pay rent due or 
quit the premises. 
Given the potential harshness to the tenant of the summary 
proceeding of unlawful detainer, "Utah courts have long held that 
the requirement giving the defaulting tenant the alternative of 
paying the delinquent rent or surrendering the premises must be 
strictly complied with in order to properly state a cause of action 
for unlawful detainer." (Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, R. at 
333; Appellant Add. 1, p. 3.); SQvereen v, EfefrdQWg, 595 P.2d 852, 
854 (Utah 1979) (unlawful detainer statute must be strictly complied 
with before cause of action may be maintained); Hackford v. Snow. 
657 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Utah 1982) ("The notice provision of the 
[Forcible Entry and Detainer] Act must be strictly complied 
with."); Van Zyverden v. Farrar. 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1964) (uIt 
is uniformly held that unlawful detainer statutes provide a severe 
remedy and must be strictly complied with before the cause of 
action thereon may be maintained."); Perkins v. Spencer. 243 P.2d 
446, 449 (Utah 1952)("Unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, 
the statute must be strictly complied with in order to enforce the 
obligations imposed by it.") 
Sovereen is on point. There, the landlord served the tenant 
an unconditional notice to quit. The tenant failed to appear, so 
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the trial court entered judgment for the landlord. See 595 P. 2d at 
852. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the landlord's 
complaint had failed to state a cause of action: 
The unlawful detainer statute is a summary proceed-
ing and in derogation of the common law. It provides a 
severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that it 
must be strictly complied with before the cause of action 
may be maintained. 
Id. at 853. Since the notice did not give the tenant a chance to 
pay the rent, the Court held that the landlord's complaint did not 
state a cause of action. 
As in Sovereen. defendant here sent two possible notices to 
quit that purportedly served as a basis for the unlawful detainer 
action. However, Judge Low found that neither contained the requi-
site language giving the County the chance to pay the rent and stay 
on the land. (R. at 333, Appellant Add. 1, p. 3.) On April 3, 
1995, Attorney Beus sent a letter to the Cache County Executive: 
Pursuant to the Lease Agreement of June 21, 1994, by 
and between Leo R. Beus, et al (The Beus Group) and Cache 
County, there have been no payments made by Cache County 
since December 1994. 
Pursuant to Paragraph 18 of the Lease Agreement, we 
exercise all rights thereunder as set forth therein, 
including the right to terminate. 
(R. at 166; Appellant Add. 5) (entire text quoted.) This letter 
does not comply with the unlawful detainer statute because it does 
not give Cache County the alternative of paying the rent. 
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The second letter, dated May 10, 1995, reads: 
This letter is being sent certified so that I can 
take the appropriate steps under the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Act in the State of Utah. You are hereby 
requested to vacate the premises. If you will be kind 
enough to provide me with the appropriate addresses for 
the subtenants, I will provide them also with a certified 
copy of the letter to ask them to vacate the premises. 
(R. at 173; Appellant Add. 8, p.3.) Again, this notice fails to 
give Cache County the option to pay any rent then due and owing. 
In the April 26, 1995 letter, Attorney Beus rejected tender of 
the $2000 check for rent owing. In his May 10, 1995 letter, 
Attorney Beus also rejected tender of the $3 000 check for future 
1995 rents. 
Judge Low correctly held that defendant did not strictly 
comply with the statute as it "failed to give proper notice as 
required by § 78-36-3(1) (c) of the Utah Code and, therefore, cannot 
maintain an action for unlawful detainer." (R. at 334; Appellant 
Add. 1, 4.) 
Defendant is plainly not interested in the rent. It wants a 
forfeiture so it can lease the land at market rates. As Judge Low 
noted, it appears a bit "drastic and extreme" that the Beus group 
had no contact with Cache County for five months, and then just 
sent a letter to terminate the lease. (R. at 369, pp. 41-42; 
Appellee Add. 4, pp. 41-42.) Defendant did not simply call the 
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County to ask why the rent was late. At the April 1997 hearing on 
the cross-motions for summary judgment, Cache County tendered to 
defendant all rents owing from January 1, 1995, through 
December 31, 1997 - $19,811.62; defendant again rejected the 
tender. (Hearing Transcript, pp. 10-11.) 
II. EQUITY PRINCIPLES OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WILL 
NOT ALLOW A FORFEITURE. 
On appeal, equitable decisions are reviewed for clear error. 
Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991) (citations 
omitted). Judge Low's discretionary application of equitable 
principles was not abused, because he correctly recognized that 
u[i]n Utah, the substantial compliance doctrine furthers [the 
policy against forfeitures] by allowing equity to intervene and 
rescue a lessee from forfeiture of a lease when the lessee has 
substantially complied with the lease in good faith." (R. at 333-
34; Appellant Add. 1, pp. 3-4.) (citing Hous. Auth. of Salt Lake 
City v. Delaado. 914 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah App. 1996) (internal 
quotations omitted)). In equity, defendant cannot terminate Cache 
County's lease where there has been substantial compliance with its 
terms.1 
xThe Utah Supreme Court's recent ruling in Geisdorf v. 
Doughty, 1998 WL 321711 (Utah 1998), does not affect the case at 
bar. In Geisdorf, the court held that "although substantial 
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An instructive Utah case on substantial compliance is U-Beva 
Mines v. Toledo Mining Company. 471 P.2d 867 (Utah 1970). U-Beva 
leased its smelting operation to the Toledo Mining Company in 
exchange for rent and Toledo's promise to pay all applicable taxes. 
The lease provided that "for any breach of the agreement by lessee, 
the lessor might terminate 60 days after written notice of inten-
tion to terminate for breach, unless the lessee had cured it in the 
interim." Id. Toledo failed to pay a $95 tax, and on December 13, 
1967, U-Beva sent a notice to Toledo which, for purposes of the 
decision, was assumed to be the sixty-day notice required by the 
lease. Id. Under the lease, Toledo had until February 11, 1968, 
to cure its default. Toledo did not pay the tax until February 29, 
1968, eighteen days after the deadline. Id. Despite the late 
payment, the court was quick to point out that Toledo paid the 
taxes within the redemption period, so there was no actual harm to 
U-Beva7s interests. Id. 
compliance is sufficient for bilateral contracts, performance of an 
option requires strict compliance." Id. at *4. The holding is 
limited to the exercise of an option, which is the creation of a 
new contract. Geisdorf therefore does not apply to this case 
because both parties are already bound by a contract. As the court 
notes, vx[t]he rule of substantial compliance with the terms of the 
contract which is applicable to bilateral contracts whereby both 
parties are already bound is not applicable to the exercise of an 
option, which . . . is a continuing offer to make a bilateral 
contract [and] must be accepted precisely according to the terms of 
the offer." Id. (citation omitted). 
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The Utah Supreme Court held that even though Toledo's payment 
came nearly three weeks after the deadline imposed by U-Beva under 
the lease, it would be inequitable to allow a forfeiture for a late 
payment of $95 when Toledo had already expended $55,000 pursuing 
other lease provisions: 
[W]e are constrained to believe, and so conclude, that in 
equity [Toledo] is relieved from any departure here, on 
the grounds that the defection was so minor as to invoke 
the offices of equity, and that at law substantial 
compliance with the contract . . . would purge an 
erstwfrile default under a generally accepted pclicy 
against forfeiture, and that otherwise, there would be an 
unconscionability heretofore condemned by us, justifying 
the invocation of equitable principles restricting even 
the freedom of contracting improvidently. 
Id. at 86 9 (emphasis added). 
In Housing Auth. of Salt Lake City v. Delgado. 914 P.2d 1163, 
1165 (Utah App. 1996) , this Court set forth a lucid and compre-
hensive discussion of the substantial compliance doctrine: 
In recent years, the Utah Supreme Court "has conformed 
the common law in this state to contemporary conditions 
by rejecting the strict application of traditional 
property law to residential leases, recognizing that it 
is often more appropriate to apply contract law." Wade 
v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991). Substantial 
compliance is one of the contract law doctrines that has 
been imported into lease cases. 
ijjJL at 1165 (citing U-Beva. 471 P.2d at 869). This Court then 
examined other leading authorities and found that each applied the 
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same principles of substantial performance in residential and com-
mercial settings alike. 
Our conclusion that equitable principles may be 
applied in an appropriate situation--even involving 
nonpayment of rent--to preclude forfeiture of a lease is 
further bolstered by the Second Restatement of Property, 
which does not distinguish between residential and 
commercial leases in stating: "Equitable considerations 
in regard to the tenant's failure to meet his rental 
obligation may justify relieving him from forfeiture of 
the lease for his failure to pay the rent despite 
provisions in the lease which would other wise allow it." 
Restatement (Second) of Property § 12.1 cmt. n (1976); 
see also Robert S. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord 
and Tenant § 6.2, at 392 (1980) ("On well established 
principles of equity, courts have routinely granted 
relief from forfeiture in the case of a breach of a 
covenant to pay rent ... where the tenant stands ready to 
correct his default."); 49 AM.JUR.2D Landlord & Tenant 
§ 342 (1995) (observing equitable relief against 
forfeiture may be available when regular rent payment is 
not technically timely because of relatively 
insignificant act or omission of lessee acting in good 
faith). 
Delgado, 914 P.2d at 1165 (Emphasis added.) After reviewing these 
authorities, this Court concluded that a tenant's failure to trace 
a lost money order for three weeks after the initial tender of 
rent, and the tenant's mistaken tender of a sum $.96 less than 
actually due, did not warrant a forfeiture of the lease. See id. 
at 1166. 
Judge Low's decision is supported by the same authorities sup-
porting the decision in Delgado and by case law from other juris-
dictions. For instance, in Foundation Dev. Corp. v. Loehmann's. 
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Inc. , 788 P.2d 1189 (Ariz. 1990), a landlord brought an action 
under a lease forfeiture clause against a commercial tenant owing 
$3,000 in rent. A notice indicating the tenant had not paid enough 
rent was sent and a check was tendered by the accounting department 
three days late. Noting the landlord was not after the rent, but 
was after a forfeiture, the court held: 
[W] e now join the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
that hold the landlord's right to terminate is not 
unlimited. We believe a court's decision to permit 
termination must be tempered by notions of equity and 
common sense. We thus hold a forfeiture for a trivial or 
immaterial breach of a commercial lease should not be 
enforced. 
Id. at 1197; see also, Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Commercial 
Leases: Application of Rule That Lease May Be Canceled Only For 
"Material" Breach. 54 A.L.R. 4th 595 (1987). 
The South Carolina Supreme Court similarly held that "a 
forfeiture for a trivial or immaterial breach of a commercial lease 
should not be enforced." Kiriakides v. United Artists Commu-
nications. Inc.. 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (S. Car. 1994). In that case 
the tenant had made substantial improvements to the leasehold, was 
paying below market rates and attempted to immediately remedy the 
late payments. The court determined that equity would not allow a 
forfeiture that would severely damage the tenant and where the 
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landlord could show no substantial damage by the late payments. 
See id. at 367. 
Other courts in similar cases have also held that equity will 
not allow forfeiture. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that 
equity abhors forfeiture, and that if the rent payment can be 
secured then equity will not permit forfeiture. See Fellows v. 
Martin. 584 A.2d 458, 463 (Conn. 1991). The Court of Appeals of 
Michigan held that tendering rent two days late in a commercial 
lease is not a material breach allowing forfeiture. See Erickson 
v. Bay City Glass Co.. Inc.. 148 N.W.2d 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967). 
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that forfeitures are not 
favored in law or equity and landlords will not ordinarily be 
allowed to invoke forfeiture over improved property before the end 
of a lease. Litchfield Company of South Carolina. Inc. v. 
Kiriakides. 349 S.E.2d 344, 347-48 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). Rather, 
courts will ''seize upon even the slightest evidence to prevent a 
forfeiture." Id. 
Here, Judge Low correctly held that the County had 
substantially complied with the lease. Critically, the lease was 
part of a settlement of a title dispute, where the County quit-
claimed to Defendant all interest in the only land suitable for 
television and cellular transmissions into the Cache Valley. In 
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exchange, Defendant leased the land to the County for ten years, 
for a de minimis rent of $500 per month. As part of the settle-
ment, Defendant permitted the County to honor its below-market 
sublease to Cellular One. The County's relinquishment of its claim 
to the land means that the Beus Group has already received sub-
stantially all the value it will receive under the settlement 
agreement. 
Defendant now seeks to capitalize on what Judge Low termed a 
"trivial" violation of the lease to deprive Cache County of the 
only value it received in return for relinquishing its claim to a 
title in fee simple absolute. Forfeiture is inequitable because of 
the severe damages that would result: the County would lose the use 
of substantial physical improvements to the site--another windfall 
to defendant, who would then be free to lease the building to 
others. Defendant acknowledges it seeks $7,000 per month--fourteen 
times the lease rate of $500 per month. (R. at 369, p. 63; 
Appellee Add. 4, p. 63.) 
The County would have to end its public service of trans-
mitting television signals to the people; there is no other site it 
can use. The County receives no money for this service, so it 
cannot afford Attorney Beus's demand for a market rate lease. 
Finally, Cellular One threatened the County that it will seek money 
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damages in excess of several hundred thousands of dollars if the 
County is forced off the premises and breaches its sublease with 
Cellular One. (R. at 369, pp. 11-12; Appellee Add. 4, pp. 11-12.) 
The authorities cited by this Court in Delgado directly uphold 
the trial court's ruling in the case at bar. The County's rent 
payment was "not technically timely" but the County's omission was 
"relatively insignificant ... [and] in good faith." Delgado, 914 
P.2d at 1165 (citing 49 AM. JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant § 342 (1995)) . 
Further, the County "stands ready to correct [its] default." See 
id. (citing Schoshinksi, American Law of Landlord and Tenant 
§ 6.2.) Under the circumstances, the County substantially complied 
with its obligations; it is thus appropriate for equity to 
intervene, relieving the County "from forfeiture of the lease for 
failure to pay rent despite provisions in the lease which would 
otherwise allow it." See id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Property § 12.1 cmt. n.) Given the applicability of these 
authorities to this case, the trial court properly held that Cache 
County's tender, in good faith, of $2,000 to cover the amount of 
default a mere one day after the ten day period required by the 
contract is at most a minor technical violation of the lease 
agreement and constitutes substantial compliance. . . . Requiring 
the County to forfeit its lease for such a trivial breach is a 
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result that far exceeds any damages suffered by the Beus Group and 
would be contrary to fundamental principles of equity and fairness. 
(R. at 334; Appellant Add. 1, p. 4.) 
In sum, the county would either have to pay $78,000 more a 
year for 9.5 years--$741,000--to keep televisions on in Cache 
Valley and honor its sublease to Cellular One, or vacate the land, 
pull the plug on television, and pay damages to Cellular One--all 
because the de minimis rent was one day late. Judge Low easily 
recognized the obvious and gross inequity in allowing a forfeiture 
in this case. His decision should be affirmed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED CACHE COUNTY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THERE ARE NO GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
The trial court correctly found that there is no dispute as to 
any material facts. First, Defendant does not dispute any facts 
regarding the issue of improper notice to Cache County. Second, 
there is ample support in the record for the trial court's decision 
that principles of equity and fairness will not permit the type of 
relief sought by the defendant. 
The trial court granted Cache County's motion for summary 
judgment on two separate grounds. First, that v[t]he Beus Group 
failed to give proper notice as required by § 78-36-3(1)(c) and, 
therefore, an action for unlawful detainer cannot be maintained." 
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(R. at 334; Appellant Add. 1, p. 4.) Defendant disputes no facts 
related to this holding; it only contests the applicable law. 
In the alternative, the trial court held that "even if proper 
notice had been given, principles of equity and fairness will not 
permit the type of relief sought by the defendant." (R. at 334; 
Appellant Add. 1, p. 4.) The Beus Group disputes this holding, 
claiming that "genuine issues of material fact remain unresolved as 
to the adverse consequences that Cache County will suffer if the 
Lease is terminated in proportion to the damages suffered by the 
Beus Group due to Cache County's default." 
Defendant, however, never raised disputed material facts as a 
basis upon which the Court should deny the County's motion for 
summary judgment. Nowhere in its motion for summary judgment or in 
its brief in opposition to the County's motion does it cite any 
material factual disputes. Now, for the first time, Defendant 
raises this ground as a reason that summary judgment should not 
have issued. It is too late to raise this contention. 
In addition, despite defendant's assertions, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether equity will allow a 
forfeiture. There is no dispute over the damages that forfeiture 
will cause the County. First, both sides agree on the facts con-
cerning Cache County's compliance with the lease. As the court 
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notes in the facts, the Beus Group's letter of April 3 was received 
by Cache County on April 10, "at which time the County Executive 
made a written request that the Cache County Auditor release $2,000 
in funds to pay the full amount owing. A check was issued for this 
amount, payable to the Beus Group, on April 20, and sent the 
following day." (R. at 332; Appellant Add. 1, p. 2.) These facts 
support the trial court's decision that the breach was trivial and 
that Cache County substantially complied with the lease. 
Furthermore, the trial court cites to facts that establish 
that the lease is very valuable to Cache County. In 1977 Cache 
County acquired property interests in Mt. Pisgah "for the purpose 
of constructing, operating, and accessing a telecommunications 
facility. The County invested considerable sums in improvements to 
the site, including constructing a building on the mountain top." 
(R. at 331-32; Appellant Add. 1, pp. 1-2.) The court further notes 
that the "lease in the present case arose from a dispute over land 
occupied by Cache County but which the Beus Group contends it 
purchased in 1986. In exchange for Cache County's quitclaim of its 
interest in the property, the parties entered into a ten year lease 
agreement with rental payments of $500 per month--an amount 
substantially below the market rate." (R. at 334; Appellant Add. 
1, p. 4.) 
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If the court were to order a forfeiture, the damages would be 
severe. Defendant acknowledges that it wants considerably more 
than the $500 rent that was agreed to in the original lease. 
(R. at 369, p. 63; Appellee Add. 4, p. 63.) Furthermore, Cellular 
One has threatened to the County that it will seek several hundred 
thousand dollars if the County is forced off the premises and 
breaches its sublease with Cellular One. (R. at 369, pp. 11-12; 
Appellee Add. 4, pp. 11-12.) 
Clearly the lease has a substantial value for Cache County. 
The trial court properly found that the result sought by the Beus 
Group would lead to unjust enrichment, is based solely upon minor 
and technical defalcations, and would be contrary to fundamental 
principles of equity and fairness. Although Defendant claims the 
proportion of damages to each side remains at issue, it has failed 
to supply any proof of the extent of the damage it suffered due to 
Cache County's late payment. *[W]hen the moving party has 
presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, 
and the opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial 
court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of fact is 
present or would be at trial." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 
768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989)(citing Dupler v. Yates. 351 P.2d 624, 
636-37 (Utah 1960) . 
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In addition, defendant has not marshaled the evidence sup-
porting the Court's decision, nor has defenant demonstrated that in 
light of the evidence supporting the Court's equitable decision, it 
was nonetheless an abuse of discretion. See Utah Medical Products, 
Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998) (explaining it is 
appellant's burden to marshal all evidence supporting trial court's 
findings and to show, in light of such evidence, that trial court's 
ruling was erroneous). Where an appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court must assume the evidence supported 
the court's findings. See id. Here, as the only dispute between 
the parties concerns the legal significance of facts, the trial 
court properly granted Cache County's motion for summary judgment. 
IV. CACHE COUNTY SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Paragraph 16 of the Lease provides that u[t]he substantially 
prevailing party in any litigation hereunder shall be entitled to 
its reasonable attorney's fees and court costs, including appeals 
if any." (R. at 20; Appellant Add. 3, p. 9.) The trial court's 
Memorandum Decision on September 3, 1997 stated that costs and fees 
were awarded to defendant despite the fact that Cache County had 
prevailed in the action because Cache County had committed a 
trivial breach of the of the contract which had led to the initial 
litigation. (R. at 345.) 
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Cache County has satisfied the judgment against it for costs 
and attorney fees. Defendant has been made whole from Cache 
County's trivial breach. (R. at 360.) Cache County asserts that 
as the parties are now on equal ground, Cache County should be 
awarded attorney's fees and costs of the appeal under Paragraph 16 
of the lease. PDO Lube Center, Inc. V. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 799-
800 (Utah App. 1997)(The court awarded PDQ attorney fees and costs 
on appeal pursuant to a contractual provision where PDQ was the 
actual prevailing party on appeal.)(citing R & R Energies v. Mother 
Earth Indus.. Inc,. 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites 
and give proper notice to place Cache County in unlawful detainer. 
Furthermore, Cache County substantially complied with the lease; 
principles of equity will not allow a forfeiture. The trial 
court's decision to grant Cache County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed, and the lease should remain in full 
force and effect. In addition, Cache County should be awarded its 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs on appeal. The case should be 
remanded to the trial court with instructions to determine fees and 
costs. 
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DATED t h i s /£ day of Septettiber, 1998 . 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
AZf?6( By / r y f r c fu<3t£*.—-
Andrew M. Morse #4498 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE CACHE COUNTY were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following this (S day of September, 1998: 
Lyle W. Hillyard, Esq. 
Brian G. Cannell, Esq. 
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen, P.C. 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
/j-^fU f^Uat^e^-
Andrew M. Morse 
Tabl 
ANDREW M. MORSE (4498) 
RICHARD A. VAN WAGONER (A4690) 
JULIANNE P. BLANCH (A6495) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CACHE COUNTY, a body politic, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEO R. BEUS, ANNETTE BEUS, 
MALCOLM C. YOUNG, ALICE H. 
YOUNG, CHARLES M. YOUNG, 
JOHN H. YOUNG, WILLIAM 
HORSLEY, and SUSAN HORSLEY 
("THE BEUS GROUP"), 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LYNN LEMON 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950000081 CV 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
) 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE ) 
I, LYNN LEMON, do hereby state the following under the pains and penalties of 
perjury: 
1. I am the County Executive for Cache County. 
2. In my capacity as County Executive for Cache County, I have personal 
knowledge of the business practices of Cache County. 
3. It is the normal practice of Cache County to make and keep records of all 
regular business activities. 
4. I have seen the documents attached as Exhibits to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment specifically including photocopies of: the lease agreement between Cache County 
and the Beus Group dated June 21, 1994, the letter from Leo Beus to the County Executive for 
Cache County date-stamped April 10, 1995, the miscellaneous expenditure voucher submitted 
by myself to the Cache County Auditor on April 10, 1995, a check from Cache County made 
payable to the Beus Group, dated April 20, 1995, and a letter from Leo Beus to myself dated 
May 10, 1995. 
5. The documents attached as Exhibits to the Motion for Summary Judgment are 
all business records of Cache County. 
6. In 1977 Cache County acquired certain real property interests and easements on 
and leading to Mt. Pisgah for the purpose of constructing and operating a telecommunications 
site. 
7. The Mt. Pisgah site is the only practical location from which to transfer 
television and cellular telephone signals between the Salt Lake and Cache Valleys. 
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8. In 1990, a dispute arose between Cache County and the Beus Group concerning 
ownership of the property on Mt. Pisgah then being occupied by Cache County. A quiet title 
action was filed captioned Leo R. Beusr et al. v. Promontory-Cache Development, et al.. Civil 
No. 900000347. 
9. Subsequent to the filing of this suit, a settlement agreement was entered into on 
May 2, 1994. Under the settlement, Cache County quit-claimed to the Beus Group the 
property it had improved, used, and occupied on Mt. Pisgah, and the Beus Group leased the 
site back to Cache County for a period of ten years at a rate substantially below market value. 
The lease agreement does not specify when rental payments are to be made. 
10. In December 1994, I caused Cache County to tender to the Beus Group payment 
for the months of July through December 1994. This payment was accepted by the Beus 
Group. 
11. On April 10, 1995 I received a letter from Mr. Beus purporting to terminate 
Cache County's lease for nonpayment of rent. On the same day that I received the letter from 
Mr. Beus, I requested that the Cache County Auditor prepare a check for the payment for the 
period from January through April 1995. 
12. This check was prepared on April 20, 1995 and mailed on April 21, 1995. 
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13. The Beus Group rejected the tender. 
DATED this >6 day of March, 1997. 
LynnL© 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £U>Z day of March, 1997. 
My Commission Expires: 
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f . X t v n u i . u r a ^ 
LEO R. BEUS 
MALCOLM C. YOUNG 
WILLIAM HORSLEY 
3200 N. Central, Suite 1000 
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 
April 3, 1995 
Mr. Seth Allen 
County Executive 
120 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Mr. Gary O. McKean 
Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Re: Lease Agreement between The Beus Group and Cache County 
Gentlemen: 
Pursuant to the Lease Agreement of June 21, 1994, by and between Leo R. Beus, et al 
(The Beus Group) and Cache County, there have been no payments made by Cache County since 
December of 1994. 
Pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Lease Agreement, we exercise all rights thereunder as 
set forth therein, including the right to terminate. 
On Behalf of The Beus Group 
. jchtd Bids (Ovac $500) 
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